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In the subprime lending market, Ameriquest Mortgage Company is one of the 
leading lenders. It is widely known for its advertising slogan of “proud sponsor of 
the American dream.” Yet in 2006, an investigation into unlawful mortgage lending 
practices and the subsequent $325 million multi-State settlement brought even 
more attention to this company.  
What caused this lawsuit which brought irreparable damage to its reputation and 
financial loss for Ameriquest? This study focuses on the Information System 
Security management of the company.  The study first introduces Ameriquest, and 
then briefly describes the lawsuit and settlement, and then discusses the IS security 
control in Ameriquest. The discussion will cover the internal control, external 
control, and technical controls of the company. 
  
PORTUGUESE JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, VOL XVII, NO 2, 2012 
 154 
 
Profile of Ameriquest 
Founded in 1979, Ameriquest is one of the United States’ leading subprime lenders. 
It started as a bank - Long Beach Saving & Loan, in Orange County, California. In 
1994, it was converted to a pure mortgage lender. In 1997, the retail part of the 
business was alienated from the business and renamed Ameriquest. In May, 2006, 
Ameriquest closes all of its retail offices, and opted to negotiate all future loans 
through brokers. 
Ameriquest is best known for its subsidiary - Ameriquest Mortgage Company, which 
makes direct loans to customers. Its Argent Mortgage Company affiliate works in 
partnership with independent brokers. Today, Ameriquest has its headquarters in 
Orange County, California, and is comprised of over 250 branches, offering services 
in 46 states, with more than 12,000 employees. Other subsidiaries are Ameriquest 
Mortgage Securities, Long Beach Acceptance Corp., and Town & Country Credit. 
As a privately owned company, Ameriquest primarily makes refinancing loans to 
existing homeowners who have less-than-perfect credit and insufficient income to 
qualify for conventional loans.  Statistically, those with lower credit scores are more 
likely to default on a loan. Therefore, Ameriquest and other sub-prime lender charge 
these customer with higher interest rates than those that have good credit history.  
Another thing that needs to be mentioned about Ameriquest is that it was among 
the first mortgage companies to use computers to search for prospective borrowers 
and also to speed up the loan process.  
  
The Lawsuits and the Multi-State Settlement  
Ameriquest, which was founded by Roland Arnall as Long Beach Savings in 1979, 
has faced a series of disputes over its lending practices with consumer activists, 
regulators and private litigants, dating back to 1996. 
In 1996, Ameriquest was accusing of exploiting older, female and minority 
borrowers. According to the lawsuit, mortgage brokers and Ameriquest employees 
charged an additional fee of as much as 12% of the loan to these disadvantaged 
customers. The company paid three million dollar to settle the case.  
In 2001, Ameriquest was investigated by the Federal Trade Commission. The 
company had to offer $360 million in low-cost loans to settle a predatory lending 
dispute with ACORN, a national coalition of community organizations.  
The next lawsuit involving Ameriquest regards putting pressure on Connecticut 
customers early on to commit to refinancing. In January, 2004, the company settled 
this case by paying $603,552 of refunds, and an additional $500 to each borrower 
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(totaling $62,000), as well as a $5,000 civil penalty to the State. More recently, the 
same problems surfaced again, but this time round the Department of Banking 
threatened to take away Ameriquest's license. This case is still pending. 
On the 1st of August 2005, Ameriquest announced that it would set aside $325 
million for contingencies for settling Attorney General investigations in 30 states, 
which is the second-largest State or Federal consumer protection settlement in 
American history. These lawsuits accused Ameriquest employees of: forging loan 
documents, pumping up appraisals, providing phony credit and employment 
histories, and of changing the terms of loans. The company was also accused of 
"bait- and-switch" tactics, in which borrowers discovered that Ameriquest provided 
inadequate disclosure of prepayment penalties, discount points and other loan 
terms; made unsolicited refinancing offers without adequate disclosure of 
prepayment penalties; improperly influenced and accepted inflated appraisals, and; 
misrepresented consumers' credit ratings and the availability and cost of future 
refinance loans.  
The settlement does not constitute an admission of wrongdoing by Ameriquest. 
However, the mortgage lender agreed to establish new standards to prevent the 
alleged unfair and deceptive practices.  
Under the agreement, Ameriquest is required to: 
 Provide the same interest rates and discount points for similarly-situated 
consumers.  
 Not pay incentives to sales personnel that include prepayment penalties or 
any other fees or charges on the mortgages. 
 Provide full disclosure regarding interest rates, discount points, prepayment 
penalties, and other loan or refinancing terms. 
 Overhaul its appraisal practices by: removing branch offices and sales 
personnel from the appraiser selection process, instituting an automated 
system to select appraisers from panels created in each State, limiting the 
company's ability to get second opinions on appraisals, and prohibiting 
Ameriquest employees from influencing appraisals. 
 Not encourage prospective borrowers to mis-state income sources or income. 
 Provide accurate, good faith estimates. 
 Limit prepayment penalty periods on variable rate mortgages. 
 Not engage in re-financing solicitations during the first 24 months of a loan, 
unless the borrower is considering refinancing. 
 Use independent loan closers.  
 Adopt policies to protect whistle-blowers and report improper conduct. 
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Ameriquest has already implemented several of these requirements, including 
appointing an independent monitor to oversee its compliance with the settlement 
terms. The Monitor will submit periodic compliance reports to the Attorneys 
General over the next five years. 
  
Ameriquest IS Security Management 
One year after the settlement, Ameriquest was left with both reputation damage and 
a huge financial loss. Last Spring, faced with declining subprime production and a 
changing retail landscape, Ameriquest Mortgage - once the nation's largest 
subprime lender - closed its entire retail branch network (229 locations), slashing 
3,800 jobs in the process, only maintaining call centers in the retail channel. 
The story of Ameriquest is a lesson for sub-prime lenders and is a good case study to 
consider, due to the unique nature of the business, and for understanding what is 
the best form of security governance. The settlement can provides a framework for 
new lending policies and standards that improve IS security for the whole industry. 
In the following section, the study will discuss Ameriquest’s IS security control from 
four perspectives: culture, internal control, external control and technical control.  
Culture 
High Pressure  
“Sell, sell, sell” is the Focus of Ameriquest’s corporate culture. This aggressive 
culture promoted the “anything-to-get-the-deal” mentality, which led to abuse.  
According to interviews with former employees from Ameriquest, some managers 
would declare a “power hour” on some days, during which the salespeople were 
required to stand at their desk until they signed up a new client. One former 
employee said that “…. we were pushed to work 12 hour days, to never leave the 
office for lunch, and to work on Saturdays.  Month ends were all about working until 
midnight just to get an approval for a loan that would be back-dated and closed the 
next day (in order for it to count for the current month).” 
Mark Bomchill, who now works as a loan consultant for Plymouth, a Minnesota - 
based Allstate Residential Mortgage lender, typically processed two or three 
application for home loans each month before he worked in Ameriquest. After 
working for Ameriquest, he said that "It was so out of hand, I was juggling 10 to 15 
new loans every month ……. and there were guys in my office doing two or three 
times as many as I was. No one ever thought to question whether [the loan] was 
right for the customer or for the lender. It was just do the deal and to move on to the 
next."  
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Even though he and others in his office were closing more than 80 new loans every 
month, this wasn't enough to satisfy senior management. Managers often yelled at 
salespeople to make more calls and to find more customers.   
When talking about high pressure in the office, people tend to remember the 2000 
movie Boiler Room, starring Giovanni Ribisi and Vin Diesel. According to Lisa Taylor, 
a former loan agent in the Sacramento branch, the atmosphere at her office was very 
similar to that portrayed in the movie. One manager even used the film as a training 
model. "That was your homework…. watch Boiler Room", Taylor said in her 
statement.    
Unethical Practice 
The high-pressure sales culture was tactical. Ameriquest managers were required to 
promote a “do-anything-to-get-the-deal” mentality. Some managers even 
encouraged employees to “promise certain interest rates and fees, only to change 
these rates at the time of closure.”  
Unethical practice becomes a common phenomenon at Ameriquest. “It was just the 
atmosphere of the company. No one cared, as long as the volume kept growing”, 
according to a former Ameriquest employee.  
The unethical and even illegal environment pervaded into most of Ameriquest’s 
sales office. Documents were altered to show higher incomes for applicants, and 
appraisers were encouraged to raise valuations on properties in order to make 
loans go through. 
According to a former loan processor for Ameriquest, as well as to several State 
Attorneys General, individual Ameriquest loan agents routinely circumvented the 
company's loan processing system in order to approve loans and to inflate the fees 
and interest rates charged.  
Early in 2007, statements were recorded in a class-action lawsuit at the U.S District 
Court of San Francisco, where it was said that “loan agents routinely witnessed, or 
participated in falsifying data that was then entered into the Ameriquest loan 
processing system”. 
Former Ameriquest employee Joseph Khaliq testified that some loan agents would 
"ask borrowers to sign blank documents. After the borrowers had left, employees 
would fill out the loan documents as they saw fit ... I [also] witnessed employees at 
the San Mateo branch forge borrowers' signatures on loan documents." He also said 
that Ameriquest loan agents would encourage borrowers to state a much higher 
income than they really earned, just to get their loan approved.  
In a 2004 case, Idanel Bonaparte received a loan for $108,000 from an Ameriquest 
branch in Tampa, Florida. Her financial assets included a 401(k) account worth 
$25,456.53. A month later, Linda Hubbard refinanced her home with a $211,000 
PORTUGUESE JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, VOL XVII, NO 2, 2012 
 158 
 
loan from Ameriquest. Her application also included a 401(k) account with the exact 
same $25,456.53 balance. Furthermore, two months later, Romy Hodge refinanced 
her house with a $75,000 loan and, much to her surprise, she too, was credited with 
a 401(k) account that had a balance of exactly $25,456.53. Hubbard and Hodge did 
not provide this information - it just recycled legitimate loan agent financial 
documents to get loans approved.  
Internal Control 
Corporate Structure 
For the last several years, interest rates hit historically low levels and, as a result, 
more and more people jumped into the real estate market without careful 
consideration. In such a hot real estate environment, those with a damaged credit 
record seek help from subprime mortgage companies.  Understandably, Ameriquest 
expanded rapidly during this period.  
When Ameriquest was first founded, it undertook all business from its branch 
network. Leads came in from connections with local real estate agents, or were 
distributed from a centralized group.  
To speed up loan processing and improve efficiency, the company was organized in 
an assembly-line fashion. The company’s central retail back office was located in 
Orance, CA and it also had processing centers located in Sacramento, a Chicago 
suburb of Schaumburg, Ill., and also in Arizona, and Connecticut.  
In 2006, the company announced to close all its network of retail branches, and 
adopted a new, centralized retail lending model to quickly adjust to the mortgage 
market's ups and downs and to operate more efficiently.  
The top management thought that a centralized structure would make it easier to 
train employees, balance workflow and expand. During an interview, Aseem Mital, 
ACC Capital Holdings' chief executive said, “In the past, when loan demand was 
especially high at one branch, Ameriquest would refer prospects to a nearby one. 
You may have had one branch underutilized, but in a center like this, you have more 
balance". He also said that the operation center would operate at 80% capacity, so it 
could ramp up if necessary.  
Another benefit, according to the top management, was to easily comply with the 
company’s multi-State settlement. In a centralized system, less authority would have 
been given to loan officers. 
Verification of Data 
The process of celebrating a mortgage loan (also called the loan cycle) has five 
distinct steps: application, loan processing, loan underwriting, loan closing, and loan 
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servicing. Simply put, during the application process the applicant provides basic 
information and then during the loan processing stage, detailed information about 
the borrower is collected and verified, followed by the transaction itself. Based on 
the information gathered during the first stage, the loan underwriting stage 
determines the risk for the lender. If the loan is approved, then the loan goes to the 
closing stage, and finally to servicing.  
These steps and processes, if carried out properly, with proper supervision and 
documentation, can ensure data integrity. However, in some of the cases detailed in 
the class-action suits that Ameriquest recently settled, many of the appropriate 
checks and balances appear to have been ignored. 
At discussed earlier, during the application and loan processing stage, borrowers 
are encouraged to “inflated their income” in order to gain the loan and the loan 
salesperson routinely falsified data, which was then entered into the Ameriquest 
loan processing system.  
At the underwriting stage, the application is passed along for review by the 
underwriter. In the past, both the loan application and supporting documents such 
as W-2s, bank statements, 401(k) statements and other financial records were kept 
together in one file for review. However, after Ameriquest adopted an automation 
system, at the beginning of the loan cycle the loan agent entered all documentation 
electronically.  
This should not have been a problem, if the underwriter was able to access the file 
and verify its correctness and reasonability. However, in some cases, the 
underwriter was merely reviewing the data entered into the system by the loan 
agent, and was not double-checking the actual physical documents.  
Independency of Responsibility 
In March 20, 2006, Jimmy and Florence Grice sued Ameriquest and appraiser Rick 
Hyatt for $1.1 million in Henderson County, Tennessee. They accused Ameriquest 
and the appraiser of conspiring to inflate the value of their properties. ." He (the 
appraiser) said that our house's price was double what it was worth. It was properly 
appraised for $67,500, and yet it was originally appraised for $130,000 by 
Ameriquest." The couple said that the inflated appraisal was predetermined, in 
order that the Grices could obtain a refinancing loan of $110,500, at a 1.784% 
interest rate.  
The Grices’ case was not the first one, and will not be the last case that sues 
Ameriquest’s appraisal practice. In Ameriquest, the loan officers would apply high 
pressure on the appraiser to generate house values that would enable loans to be 
accepted.  
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Before the multi-State settlement, branch staff had the authority to order appraisals 
for customers.  Ameriquest centralized appraisals after it closed its retail branch 
network. The company uses a "preferred panel" of licensed appraisers with at least 
five years' experience. All appraisals were submitted electronically, in a portable 
document format, in order that "none of the data could be manipulated." The 
appraisals were "run through a series of rules to make sure" that the appraiser was 
using the correct comparable sales, and only about 30% of appraisals were 
reviewed by in-house appraisers prior to funding. Furthermore, salespeople have 
"no influence" on the appraiser panel's makeup.  
Dealing with a “Bad Apple” 
Ameriquest alleged that it was “a nationwide lender and our goal is to continue to 
lead the industry through best practices and to provide superior products and 
services". The company’s top management stated that "We hold ourselves to the 
highest standards and ethical practices, and do not tolerate unethical or improper 
behavior by our employees or by our vendors."  
The company stated that it actively monitors employees for fraud or 
misrepresentation, and that it immediately terminates those who fail to comply. 
New employees were required to take an ethics test during their orientation 
training. Appraisals were monitored by a centralized appraisal department, and 
Ameriquest said that they were reviewed by an automated process. 
Mr. Mital said in an interview: "There were instances [of abuse], and we dealt with 
those right away. If somebody bends the rules, then we get rid of those people and 
immediately go back and ... [find out] if there was any customer who had been 
treated unfairly. " 
The top management said that they preferred informal resolutions. “Basically, if you 
see a problem, what's the point of resolving the matter in court? You try to reach a 
reasonable resolution.” 
In 2004, company launched an anonymous whistle-blower policy to help it identify 
quicker when employees were not doing the right thing. Under this policy, the 
independent loan closer was to provider a written report both to designated 
Ameriquest Party senior management, and also to the Monitor during the 
compliance monitoring period, If he or she discovered any unfair, deceptive, 
misleading or unlawful behavior by any Ameriquest employee in connection with 
any loan, or if the Closer failed to report such misconduct, then Ameriquest should 
take disciplinary action against the Independent Loan Closer, including the 
temporary or permanent removal of their name from the list of approved 
Independent Loan Closers. 
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Internal Auditing and Monitoring 
One of Ameriquest’s loans was called a “stated income” loan. For this product, the 
borrowers just had to declare their income. The product is originally designed for 
highly-paid-professionals whose incomes fluctuate. However, this product was used 
by Ameriquest loan officers to push up borrowers’ income.  
The applicants just needed to declare their income on the application and write a 
letter in their own handwriting stating their income and job. Renne Deane, an 
Executive Vice President, who was in charge of Ameriquest's due diligence, credit 
issues, and investor relations said that the company applies a “reasonability test” to 
determine reasonableness and accuracy of input. A quality assurance unit then went 
back and audited "up to 10% of Ameriquest production" after funding. Securitizers 
refused less than 5% of the loans out of pools on account of appraisal problems. 
External Control 
The mortgage industry is regulated by State Banking and Finance Agencies 
throughout the United States. Most States require mortgage lenders to be licensed. 
The well-known laws and regulations include the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
(HMDA), the Truth in Lending Act, and Fair Credit Reporting.  
The usual procedure is that consumers file complaints to the Department of Banking 
(or other banking agencies) about certain unethical or unfair practices. The agency 
then reviews such a case, and decides whether to investigate the business involved. 
If the result proves wrongdoings, then the company will be liable a penalty, which 
could include the suspension of its license.  
From 2000 to 2004, consumers filed 134 lending complaints against Ameriquest to 
the California Department of Corporations. An investigation was instigated to verify 
these charges.  
In Washington's Department of Financial Institutions, allegations were investigated 
by the Attorney General, and the outcome was transferred to the Department’s 
enforcement division.  
In the San Francisco civil suit, Ameriquest was charged with failing to make the 
required disclosures to borrowers, with falsifying borrowers' income amounts on 
loan applications and with saddling borrowers with bigger payments than they 
could afford. 
In Connecticut, from 2005 to 2007, 179 customers accused Ameriquest of excessive 
financial charges and $670,000 was paid out in refunds and penalties to settle these 
cases.  
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According to the DOB, in 2003 and early 2004, Ameriquest re-financed 16 
mortgages and charged prepaid finance fees that were aggregated with the prepaid 
finance charges imposed in previous financing, and "within two years of the current 
refinancing, this exceeded either $2,000, or 5% of the principal amount of the initial 
loan." 
In late January, 2004, Ameriquest settled with the State on these allegations, and 
agreed to the sanctions and to paying a civil penalty. However, the DOB noticed that 
after the initial settlement, Ameriquest funded yet another 38 loans with prepaid 
financial charges in excess of 5% of the principal loan amount.  
In December, 2014, a letter was sent to Ameriquest. In this letter, Ameriquest was 
required to “show compliance with all lawful requirements as a condition for the 
retention of its first and secondary mortgage lender/broker licenses." However, 
once again, Ameriquest failed to comply with the requirement. As a result, the State 
revoked Ameriquest’s license to fund loans.  
Furthermore, in May, 2006, Connecticut Department of Banking proposed that 24 
lending licenses held by Ameriquest and a subsidiary should not be renewed, which 
meant that Ameriquest had to stop offering loans in Connecticut. The company also 
faced more than $5.5 million in additional penalties. 
All these individual State investigations finally led to a multi-State settlement. One 
element of the Ameriquest settlement particularly addressed the external control of 
the appointment of an independent monitor and compliance committee for a period 
of five years. The independent monitor was to oversee Ameriquest’s compliance 
with the settlement terms and was given broad authority to examine Ameriquest’s 
lending operations, including its access to documents and personnel.  The Monitor 
then had to submit periodic compliance reports to the Attorneys General during the 
next five years.  Ameriquest had to pay the Monitor’s costs.  
Technical Control 
The Empower System 
 In the mortgage industry, software systems are used by mortgage brokers to weed 
out applicants with a bad financial background and to fulfill sales quotas. Most 
mortgage companies uses automated mortgage software to increase loan processing 
speed.  
The system used in Ameriquest is Empower. According to the developer, 24 of the 
top 100 lenders in the U.S. use some version of the system, including Accredited 
Home Lenders Holding Co. in San Diego; Fieldstone Investment Corp. in Columbia, 
Md., and; National City Corp. in Cleveland. 
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Ameriquest identified about 50 steps in a loan cycle where people had to physically 
handle documents and verify information. The Empower system allowed 
Ameriquest to automate about 30 of those steps.  
However, speed came with a cost. There was a lack of queries by the system for 
support documentation. Manual loan processing typically requires key financial 
documents to be attached to the loan application all the way through the application. 
From application through to processing, underwriting and closing, different 
employees in different department each handle the physical copies of W-2 reports 
and paycheck stubs. “There was ample opportunity to even accidentally notice 
discrepancies in the financial study work provided.” a former Ameriquest employee 
said. 
A lack of verification mechanism leads to an increased possibility of faulty business 
practices. With all the data managed electronically, employees at each stage of the 
loan cycle rely solely on the authenticity of the information provided by the 
Empower system.  "The idea is that once the data is entered, it can be used again and 
again electronically without being touched or reviewed by others as the loan is 
processed." Ameriquest management called this “no-touch funding”.  Once the 
income data and other supporting data are entered into the system, there is no 
routine in the system to question the entries, or to ensure its correctness and 
integrity.  
This situation put no restraint on Ameriquest employees. Some loan agents and 
processors just changed the income field as they wanted to ensure that a loan would 
pass through the system without a problem. Therefore, many borrowers were 
approved for loans that would not otherwise have been approved at a higher annual 
interest rate.  
"Ameriquest agents would use the software to qualify people for loans that they 
weren't qualified for in the first place, and were always two or three percentage 
points higher than they would have paid elsewhere," said a former Ameriquest 
employee who worked at an Ameriquest branch in Florida, who spoke on the 
condition of anonymity. "It was a standard operating procedure." 
The SNAP System 
In 2002, Ameriquest began to implement a new software system called SNAP for 
Sales Navigation and Accelerated Production in an attempt to seek greater control 
over how loan data was configured and managed in its system. 
According to Ameriquest, the new system overlapped with Empower at the front 
end of the loan origination process, and it included a complete product and pricing 
engine that allowed agents to adjust rates and fees.  
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The web-based SNAP system added new safeguards such as standardized pricing 
and automated checks for appraisals for the loan cycle. It incorporated rules for the 
loan pricing into software and limited the ability of sales representatives to 
arbitrarily raise interest rates or points. Ameriquest hoped to use this program to 
enforce “fair and uniform loan pricing, to validate appraisals and to enforce the 
distribution of legally required disclosure document to consumers”.  
“SNAP does everything that Empower doesn't," Ameriquest management said. It 
does more than merely recording loan applications. It can also help salespeople 
track contacts and sales leads, and selects the right loan product for the customers.  
Empower remained the dominant system in Ameriquest's underwriting department, 
while sales offices primarily used SNAP. 
 
Summary 
No mortgage loan is approved without a processor; and no processor makes a loan 
without running the applicant's personal and financial background. The mortgage 
industry is a human-oriented business. We cannot design the perfect system in a 
human-oriented process.  
Ameriquest learned a hard lesson through this multi-state settlement. Ameriquest 
adopted a very progressive stance, focusing on “sell, sell, sell…”, which forced 
salespersons to proceed without thinking about “what best suits the customer”. The 
company’s IS security system failed to provide a control mechanism, either internal 
or external, to monitor or disciple its employees. The technical control system just 
facilitated employees’ wrong-doings. In the end external regulators had to be 
involved to solve the problem.  
It is really hard to say that just one factor caused the failure and that a tragedy 
happened in the case of Ameriquest Mortgage Company. The multi-State settlement 
provides a wealth of useful and insightful suggestions and solutions for the 
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